Unsigned release candidate
The Build unsigned candidate GitHub Actions workflow prepares a build for review. It does not provide Authenticode signing, create an installable release, sign a release manifest, or publish a GitHub release. An unsigned candidate is not an update source and must not be presented as a signed download. SignPath approval and a real signing certificate are still prerequisites for the future signing integration.
Build and inspect a candidate
After this workflow has reached main, a maintainer can open Actions → Build unsigned
candidate → Run workflow, choose main, and enter the intended version, for example
0.3.0-rc.1. The equivalent command is:
gh workflow run build-unsigned-candidate.yml --repo MrAliev/local-ai-toolkit --ref main -f version=0.3.0-rc.1
Only a manual dispatch in MrAliev/local-ai-toolkit on refs/heads/main can run the job.
The checkout uses the immutable github.sha selected at dispatch, rather than a version
input or an arbitrary source-ref input. A later change to main does not change that
run’s source. The build script checks the repository, event, ref and checked-out SHA
again before compiling. The version must have three numeric parts, each no greater
than 65534, with an optional SemVer prerelease and no build metadata.
All compilation runs on a GitHub-hosted windows-2025 runner with the SDK from
global.json. The workflow has only contents: read, disables checkout credential
persistence, and pins its three actions to commit IDs. It has no signing credentials,
release publication permissions, caller-supplied commands, or post-build callbacks.
The script refuses to overwrite an existing candidate output directory.
A successful run uploads one artifact, named using the source SHA, run ID and run
attempt. The run summary records its GitHub artifact ID and digest. Artifacts expire
after seven days. A failed build or validation cannot upload a partial candidate.
The archive contains only these own binaries under own-pe/:
codesearch.execodesearch-mcp.exelocallm-mcp.exelocalai.exelocalai-launcher.exeLocalAi.Broker.exeLocalAi.Installer.exe
Each binary must have Authenticode status NotSigned. Loose upstream libraries and
unexpected extra executables remain outside the uploaded artifact. The eighth file,
unsigned-candidate.json, records signed: false, the version, source SHA, workflow
run and each binary’s length and SHA-256. These checksums describe the bytes; the
metadata is not a signature or independently verified build provenance. Inspect the
GitHub run and its source commit as well as the downloaded files.
What must happen before signing and publishing
SignPath’s GitHub integration checks build origin and the uploaded GitHub artifact; for its OSS service, every job before the signing request must use a GitHub-hosted runner. Submission must later be added to the trusted workflow using the actual upload step’s artifact ID. Downloading files and uploading them through an unrelated workflow is not a substitute for that integration. The GitHub upload is a ZIP archive, so the future SignPath artifact configuration must match that archive and explicitly select the seven own PE paths. Do not sign upstream DLLs with the project’s identity. SignPath GitHub integration, SignPath Foundation terms.
The remaining release work is deliberately gated:
- Obtain acceptance for the OSS project, configure actual project and policy IDs, and agree the certificate identity and required binary metadata with SignPath. Configure origin constraints and manual signing approval; the Foundation requires approval for every release. Do not accept terms or invent an issued certificate on a maintainer’s behalf. SignPath Foundation terms.
- Extend the reviewed workflow with the real signing integration, retaining the complete runtime payload from the same build separately. Keep upstream files unchanged and outside the signing selection. After approval, verify the returned signatures on all seven own PE files and replace only those files in that payload.
- Configure the installer and verifier with the actual approved certificate subject and public-key pin. Exercise first install, update, tamper rejection and certificate compatibility; a nonexistent identity cannot pass this step.
- Package the payload after Authenticode signing. Then generate its final hashes and ECDSA-signed release manifest using the separately protected release key. Do not put that private key into this candidate workflow. Publish only after package and installer verification succeed. Repacking or modifying PE files afterward invalidates earlier hashes or signatures.
The existing published-asset attestation workflow records downloaded release assets; it does not establish that those assets came from this candidate build. Neither that workflow nor this unsigned artifact closes the outstanding Authenticode requirement.